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1 Introduction
Since the ongoing 1990s household liabilities have risen sharply in the Eu-
rozone and in other OECD countries, both in absolute as well as in relative
size (Rinaldi et al., 2006). Underlying these developments have been grow-
ing competitive pressures within and on the banking sector which resulted
in declining interest rates on consumer loans as well as in lower credit con-
straints (Crook et al. 2006). A further argument explaining the increase
in household debt is related to the implementation of consumer bankruptcy
laws which oﬀer households the option to default on their loans. These
laws ﬁx exemption rates on wealth and income and clarify conditions under
which a household may obtain release from its debt. The observed sharp in-
crease in bankruptcy ﬁlings in the US during the 1990s has fuelled a debate
on whether households use their default option only in the face of adverse
shocks which make them unable to reimburse their borrowings or whether
household behave strategically. Whereas in particular sociologists advocate
the ﬁrst view (Sullivan et al., 1989), Fay et al. (2002) have found evidence
that households use their default option strategically. According to their
ﬁndings, households’ bankruptcy ﬁling rates are positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the exemption rate, i.e. that part of wealth and income
which a bank is not allowed to pledge. To understand household behaviour
under a default option is important because this helps to explain whether
the observed absolute and relative increase in debt may also enhance house-
holds’ ﬁnancial fragility which – in particular due to households’ limited
liability – may spill over to the banking sector. A positive correlation be-
tween household borrowings and household ﬁnancial fragility is less the case
if low interest rates or higher incomes can be made out as a determining fac-
tor of the credit boom than if high exemption rates set households incentives
to borrow more than otherwise.
In the following we analyse whether and how such strategical behaviour
ﬁts into the expected utility framework. Households maximizing expected
utility choose a time path for consumption which maximizes an increasing
and strictly concave utility function. According to the ﬁrst property a house-
hold prefers more consumption to less, whereas the second property makes
a household risk-averse in the sense that it prefers a safe over a random level
of consumption. The assumption of a planning horizon extending one pe-
riod moreover requires from a household to strike a balance between present
and future utility and hence between present and future consumption. In
this respect borrowing as well as saving allow to shift consumption between
periods, and the degree of risk-aversion then determines the extent to which
a household prefers these shifts due to changing interest rates. In the litera-
ture dealing with optimal household behaviour it is predominantly assumed
that households have to repay their liabilities at the end of the examined
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planning horizon, i.e., households do not possess a default option. Credit
constraints in these models indeed appear to lack any reasoning since de-
fault and furthermore information asymmetry are typically excluded from
these approaches.(Lawrance, 1995).1 An exception has been provided by
Lawrance (1995) who concludes that risk-averse households are more in-
clined to borrow when they have a default option than this would be the
case without such a possibility. In particular she ﬁnds that in a situation in
which a household would neither borrow nor save in the absence of a default
option, this same household will borrow once it can declare bankruptcy.
She explains this result by a household’s risk-aversion which implies that
the non-seizable income, which indeed constitutes a safe income, is always
preferred to random revenues. However, her model is rather special concern-
ing the assumed Bernoulli probability distribution of future incomes and the
size of the non-seizable income which is assumed to be ﬁxed at the lowest
possible income level. Due to this last restriction implications of the size
of non-seizable income remain beyond discussion. Moreover the use of a
Bernoulli distribution for future incomes makes it necessary to assume that
default coercively occurs once a low income situation is realized. This in
turn implies that households with a preference for borrowing always borrow
at least as much as this lowest income level. Finally, using a CRRA utility
function, her conclusions are more or less restricted to a graphical analysis.
In the following we generalize Lawrance (1995) by assuming a contin-
uous probability distribution for future incomes and furthermore leave the
exemption ratio of income unspeciﬁed which allows us to discuss its role for
optimal borrowing. Contrary to Lawrance (1995) we assume utility to be ex-
ponential. This allows us to introduce the certainty equivalent into expected
utility which makes it possible to analyse explicitly the role of risk and risk-
aversion. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next
section the optimization model of a risk-averse household is presented where
as a ﬁrst step the loan interest rate is taken as given Then optimal bank be-
haviour with regard to a quantitative credit constraint and the loan interest
rate will be speciﬁed, where as a ﬁrst step symmetric information between
borrower and lender will be assumed. Taking the bank’s credit policy into
account, the household’s optimization problem will be solved and results
discussed. As a further step ex post information asymmetry will be intro-
duced, which motivates the bank to charge control costs from its borrower.
The paper concludes with a summary of relevant results and a suggestion
concerning extensions.
1There is indeed a large literature on the impact of credit constraints on household
behaviour. Examples are Zeldes (1989); Deaton (1991); Carroll et al. (2001); Cox et al.
(1993), Ludvigson (1999) to name but a few.
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2 A Model of Risk-Averse Household Behaviour
We consider a household which maximizes expected utility over two peri-
ods and in doing so uses borrowings and savings in order to tilt, smooth
and stabilize2 consumption. Uncertainty is related to second-period labour
income which is assumed to be a continuous random variable   Y 3 with re-




, density function f (Yt+1) and





All variables are expressed in real terms, hence income uncertainty in our
model is equivalent with uncertainty concerning employment or real wages.
If the household decides to save, then it will purchase a riskless asset at
the amount Dt yielding a safe gross interest rate Rt+1 in the second period.
Assuming utility to be exponential, allows us to use the certainty equivalent
which turns expected utility into4
U =
 
1 − e−αCt 
+ β
 
1 − e−αCE 
(1)
where Ct stands for current consumption and can be expressed in terms of
the ﬁrst-period budget constraint
Ct = Yt + Lt − Dt (2)
with Lt standing for loans taken in the ﬁrst periods. In our model we
have neglected initial wealth, and we do not exclude the possibility that a
household will choose to borrow and to save simultaneously. CE denotes













where future random consumption   C is given by the second-period budget
constraint as follows
  C =   Y + DtRt+1 −   X (4)
Under a prevailing default option, the repayment of loans is a random vari-
able, too, which we henceforth denote by   X.
The certainty equivalent expresses a risk-averse household’s willingness
to pay a premium in order to enjoy expected future consumption with cer-


























  X,   Y
 
2As in Gr¨ oßl and Fritsche (2007) we use the term “consumption-stabilizing” to explain
savings from a precautionary motive.
3Since it is clear that random variables relate to the second period we omit the time
index henceforth.
4A formal derivation is presented in Gr¨ oßl and Fritsche, 2007.
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Notice that the expected utility framework speciﬁes risk by the variance.
Hence a risk-averse household dislikes both positive as well as negative de-
viations from long-run averages. This in turn explains why squared devia-




, are added and
not subtracted from the expected loan repayment. Note also that in con-
trast a positive covariance of income and loan repayments augments the
certainty equivalent. In order to understand this, assume that income devi-
ates negatively from its long-run average. Then, given a positive correlation
coeﬃcient, loan repayments will fall short of their long-run average, too.
Whereas the ﬁrst eﬀect reduces the certainty equivalent, the second eﬀect
does the opposite.
In accordance with the probability distribution of income speciﬁed above,




























Since loans are repaid out of income, debt repayment   X, is continuous, too
with identical density and cumulative distribution. Since the household pos-





t if Yt+1 ≥ LtRL
t + C − DtRt+1 ≡   y
Yt+1 + DtRt+1 − C if Yt+1 < LtRL
t + C − DtRt+1 ≡   y
(8)
where RL
t denotes the loan interest charged by the bank in t, and C the
exempted part of household income which we take to be guaranteed by the
prevailing bankruptcy law. Henceforth we assume that riskless assets plus






  b y
y




t f (Yt+1)dYt+1 = LtRL
t −
  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1
From (9) we see that the existence of a default option limits a household’s
liability with respect to its debt, which implies that on average a borrowing
household repays less than the contractually agreed repayment. The amount
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of this diﬀerence is determined by expected default
  b y
y F (Yt+1)dYt+1. Lim-
ited liability would motivate a risk-neutral household to borrow more than
without default option. However, a risk-averse household will also take the







  b y
y
[(Yt+1 − C + DtRt+1)]
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y















Considering only the variance (10), we see that a risk-averse household’s
incentive to borrow more under a default option is reduced by its aversion
against deviations of repayments from their long-run average. Concerning
positive deviations, this is immediately intuitive: In good years the house-
hold has to pay for a default risk which in fact does not realize. Concerning
negative deviations, this might appear implausible, however, we have to re-
call that risk-aversion in the expected utility framework is associated with
the household’s dislike of income ﬂuctuations as such and not a dislike of
incomes which are too low compared to some target level. We also observe,
however, that a positive covariance between income and debt repayments
increases a household’s appetite for credit, because any undesired labour
income volatility is at least partly compensated by a volatility of debt re-
payments. Since the loan interest rate is not exogenous in our model but
rather follows from the bank’s interest rate policy, we now turn to speciﬁng
bank behaviour.
3 Symmetric Information
3.1 A Model of Bank Behaviour under the Existence of a
Default Option When Information is Symmetric
To begin with, we assume that the distribution of information between the
bank and the borrower is symmetric. In accordance with Lawrance (1995),
we assume furthermore that the bank is risk neutral and hence is willing
to grant loans, if it can expect to earn on average the rate of return of the
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Substituting (9) into (12) leads to
LtRL
t = LtRt+1 +
  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1 (13)
Obviously the bank loan interest rate RL
t exceeds the riskless rate by the
amount of expected default. By claiming at least on average the riskless
interest rate, the bank obviously removes any incentive on the part of a risk-
neutral debtor to borrow more when a default option is available than would
be optimal without such a possibility. The bank’s interest rate policy indeed
implies that a borrower pays on average an interest rate on loans which
coincides with the riskless rate. The question now arises whether in addition
the bank will have a motive to impose quantitative credit constraints. If
information is symmetric and if furthermore the bank is risk-neutral, then
the bank will grant any loan provided it does not exceed the maximum of
income possible plus collateral and minus the non-seizable income. This is
exactly the Lawrance case. Of course further arguments in favour of tighter
credit constraints, like aversion against losses above some target level may
be conceived of, but if we want to examine consequences of an empirically
observed lowering of credit constraints, the Lawrance approach appears to








where y describes the maximum of income which the household may receive.
Considering (6), (13) and taking into account that
  y|L=Lmax = y (15)







+ DtRt+1 − C
Rt+1
(16)
3.2 Determining Optimal Household Behaviour under Infor-
mation Symmetry
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F (Yt+1)dYt+1 +
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  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1
   b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1 + (20)
(LtRt+1 − DtRt+1 + C)









  b y
y
Yt+1F (Yt+1)dYt+1 − E
 
  Y
   b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1 − (21)
1
2




Z can be interpreted as the risk cost of borrowing. Obviously its sign is
ambiguous depending on the size of   y, which denotes a level of income that
is suﬃcient for a household in order to be able to serve its debt. If the
household borrows the maximum loan size, then   y = y and the variance of
credit repayments as well as the covariance of income and repayments are
identical. Since the weight of the covariance in Z is twice as large as that
of the variance, Z is negative in this case. Stated diﬀerently, the fact that
undesired ﬂuctuations of income around its long-run average are - depending
on the loans size- partly or even fully compensated by corresponding ﬂuc-
tuations of loan repayments around their long-run average, leads to lower
cost of borrowing compared to the no-default-option-case. This and not
the prospect of a safe non-seizable income in the second period fuels the
household’s appetite for loans.
The household maximizes (1) subject to (16), the nonnegativity con-
straints
Dt ≥ 0 (22)
Lt ≥ 0 (23)
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and the credit constraint
Lmax
t ≥ Lt (24)




1 − e−αCt 
+ β
 
1 − e−αCE 
+ λ1Dt + λ2Lt + λ3 (Lmax
t − Lt) (25)
where we use (2), (16), (17) and (21). Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with
respect to the riskless asset and loans, we obtain as ﬁrst-order conditions
















αRt+1F (  y)
1 − F (  y)
 








αRt+1F (  y)
1 − F (  y)
 





Dt ≥ 0; λ1 ≥ 0; Dtλ1 = 0 (30)
Lt ≥ 0; λ2 ≥ 0; Ltλ2 = 0 (31)
Lmax
t ≥ Lt; λ3 ≥ 0; (Lmax
t Rt+1 − LtRt+1)λ3 = 0 (32)
Since obviously ∂CE
∂Dt and
     
∂CE
∂Lt
      are identical, a rational household will
never prefer to borrow and save simultaneously because this would not allow
to obtain any additional utility from this transaction. We may therefore
follow that a household either borrows or saves.
Next we investigate the case Dt > 0 and Lt = 0, which implies λ1 =
λ3 = 0 and λ2 > 0. In this case (26) reduces to
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The demand for riskless assets, which in our model coincides with the opti-
mal amount of saving, is determined by three motives: Consumption-tilting
suggests the purchase of assets if the gross real interest rate exceeds the dis-
count factor, i.e. ln(βRt+1) > 0. Consumption-smoothing requires savings
if current income is higher than expected income, and ﬁnally consumption-
stabilizing requires precautionary savings in order to compensate for labour
income risk (Gr¨ oßl and Fritsche, 2007).













If the household did not have a default option, then the size of optimal
borrowing would be just the inverse of optimal saving. In the presence
of a default option, however, the household’s aversion against positive and
negative deviations of loan repayments from their long-run average has to
be considered. To understand what this means, we ignore the covariance
of income and loan repayments for the moment. Whether the household
borrows more or less than in the absence of a default option in this case
depends on how the variance varies with loan size. For illustrative purposes




= 2σLt. In this case we would obtain as ﬁrst-order
conditions
eα(CE−Ct) = β (Rt+1 + ασ)
or in logs
CE − Ct =
1
α







− Yt − α
2V ar[Yt+1] − 1
α ln(βRt+1 + ασ)
1 + Rt+1 + ασ
Obviously in this special case, the household’s aversion against volatility
acts as an additional marginal cost of borrowing thus reducing the optimal







  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1 (36)
which is positive and which is furthermore positively correlated with the loan
size itself. In the absence of the covariance of income and loan repayments,
this would support the result of a lower optimal size of borrowings compared
to the no-default-option-case even further. However, the variance of debt
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repayments oﬀers only a partial explanation for marginal risk costs of bor-
rowing. In addition we have to account for the reaction of the covariance,
which is given by
∂Cov
 




  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1−
Rt+1F (  y)
1 − F (  y)
 





If the household prefers the maximum loan level Lmax as an optimum, then
the second term of the right-hand side of (37) is zero leading to a positive
correlation between the covariance and the amount of borrowings, thus de-
creasing marginal risk costs of borrowing. In this case any income volatility
is perfectly neutralized by the volatility of debt repayments. If for example
the household receives an income below average, which reduces the certainty
equivalent, this is oﬀset by a lower debt repayment. If the household chooses
less than Lmax, then the the reaction of the covariance to varying loan size
is ambiguous.
Of relevance to the household’s borrowing decision are total marginal




Rt+1F (  y)
1 − F (  y)
 





We observe that marginal risk cost of borrowing depend on the optimal
loan size. In particular they reduce to zero if the household wants to borrow
Lmax. This is hardly surprising because as we have already noticed, in that
case the covariance and the variance of debt repayments coincide with the
variance of income and thus do not respond to varying loan amounts.




αF (  y)
1 − F (  y)
 
LtRt+1 + C − E
 
  Yt+1
   
(39)
With the right-hand side of (39) being a function of the loan volume it-
self, a closed-form solution is not straightforward. However, recalling that
eα(CE−Ct) is always positive, we know that the right-hand side must assume







1 − F (  y)
αF (  y)
(40)
As we have already learned, marginal risk cost of borrowing are zero when-
ever the household takes its maximum loan size. Does therefore Lmax rep-
resent an optimum? A glimpse at (39) shows us that in this case marginal
cost of borrowing coincide with the no-default-case, i.e. are constant and
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equal to the riskless rate. In order to ﬁnd out whether Lmax satisﬁes (39)
take logs from both sides of (39) delivering




where we have used (16). If the household borrows Lmax, the certainty
equivalent and expected consumption for the second period coincide5 and







Hence in this case the household can expect to enjoy a safe level of consump-
tion. In order to ﬁnd out whether this constitutes an optimum we start by
setting
βRt+1 = 1 (43)
In this case (41) is equivalent to















Hence given current and expected income, a household borrows Lmax, when-
ever its non-seizable income is suﬃciently high as determined by (44). For
example if current income equals its long-run average, than a household
uses its default option, whenever the exemption level of its income equals
expected income. This indicates that lower income groups are more prone
to risking default than higher income groups. Whenever current income
exceeds its long-run average, a household’s non-seizable income has to be
higher than this long-run average. Should current income fall below its long-
run average, then a lower non-seizable income suﬃces for the household to
choose default. This also implies that the household is more inclined to risk
default in recessions than this is the case in boom situations. Whenever
βRt+1 > 1 and hence lnβRt+1 > 0, the non-seizable level of household in-
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i
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Since real interest rates are lower in recessions, this supports the argu-
ment that a rational household is more inclined to risk default in recessions
than in boom situations.
Another interesting point concerns the question whether a household
which chooses Lmax as its optimum, borrows more than in the no-default-










This amount of debt is indeed higher than in the no-default-case, and the
diﬀerence is determined by income risk and the household’s absolute degree
of risk aversion. This result is due to the fact that income volatility in
the case of Lt = Lmax together with the volatility of debt repayments are
perfectly oﬀset by the covariance of income and debt reimbursement.
We now return to the Lawrance argument which says that under a default















ln(βRt+1) = 0 (47)
describing a situation in which a household without default option would
neither save nor borrow. She explains this result by risk-aversion which
motivates a household to prefer the safe exemption level to a random level
of income. We ﬁrst check whether Lt = 0 given Dt = 0, is incompatible
with the ﬁrst-order condition (39). If the household does not borrow at all,
the right-hand side of (39) boils down to βRt+1. Moreover we obtain












which according to (47) is identical to 1
α ln(βRt+1). Hence the availability
of a default option is also compatible with a zero loan volume in the case
that (47) holds. A zero optimal loan volume, however, is not coercive. To
see this, assume again Lt = Lmax as an optimal choice. Again we receive
(41). Substituting Yt by (47), we obtain for (41)



















Hence whether Lmax qualiﬁes as an optimum, too, depends again on the size
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We may follow from (49) that it is not the mere prospect of a safe income
in the second period which may motivate the household to borrow even if
the condition (47) is met, rather, the size of this safe income has to be
suﬃciently high. The reason for this is that a household which maximizes
expected utility does not only want to minimize risk but also to maximize
consumption, and its optimal choice reﬂects a compromise of both motives.
We may therefore conclude that it is by no means certain that a house-
hold which prefers neither to borrow nor to save in the no-default-case will
choose to borrow under default. Rather, households’ borrowing behaviour
may become unpredictable in situations in which households without such
a default option would make a clear decision in favour of consuming all of
their current incomes.
4 Implications of Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry may enter the model before a contract has been
concluded.6 Then the bank is imperfectly informed about the borrower’s
quality thus risking adverse selection. Another type of information asymme-
try which becomes relevant after the contract has been concluded concerns
the bank’s inability to observe how the borrower uses the money thus risk-
ing moral hazard. Finally ex post information asymmetry implies that the
bank is able to verify the household’s realized income situation only after
undertaking costly controlling activities. Unlike Lawrance (1995), we anal-
yse this last type of information asymmetry because we think that it has
more relevance than moral hazard which is due to the evidence that nowa-
days at least consumer loans are not bound to special purposes. It may
also be more important than ex ante information asymmetry since modern
screening devices typically claim from borrowers to present income state-
ments. Like in Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1987)
let us assume that the bank undertakes costly controlling activities once the
borrower ceases to repay the loan according to the contract. For simplicity
we take these control costs as independent of loan size and equal to some
positive ﬁxed amount Q.
Ex post information asymmetry changes the structure of bank gross






t if Yt+1 ≥   y
Yt+1 − C − Q, if Yt+1 <   y
(50)
Hence in case of default the bank receives less than under symmetric in-
formation since it has to take costly controlling activities in order to verify
6This case is investigated in Lawrance (1995).
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whether the borrower acts strategically or is really unable to service his loan.
The bank continues to be willing to grant the loan if it can expect to receive







  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1 + QF (  y) = LtRt+1 (51)
QF (  y) = Q
  b y
y
f (Yt+1)dYt+1
with   XB denoting the bank’s revenues from lending. (51) requires that the
bank charges a loan interest rate which exceeds the riskless interest rate not
only by the amount of expected default but also by the amount of expected








− C − QF (  y)
Rt+1
(52)
which is deﬁnitely lower than in the case of information symmetry.
According to the bank’s interest rate policy, the borrower has to pay for






= LtRt+1 + QF (  y) (53)
he does so not only when he decides against declaring default but also as
an average over the long run. Expected control costs thus drive a wedge











+ 2(LtRt+1 + QF (  y))




  b y
y
(Yt+1 − C)F (Yt+1)dYt+1
Obviously, the variance of debt repayments increases if the bank charges
control costs from the borrower, which depend on the probability of default
F (  y). As the covariance of income and debt repayment we now get
Cov
 
  X,   Y
 
=






+ (LtRt+1 + QF (  y))
  b y
y
F (Yt+1)dYt+1 (54)





  b y
y
(2Yt+1 − C)F (Yt+1)dYt+1
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leading to risk-borrowing cost Z, of
Z =




















Rt+1F (  y)
1 − F (  y) − Qf (  y)
 




Note that expected marginal borrowing costs are now higher than without
control cost.




αF (  y)
1 − F (  y) − Qf (  y)
 
LtRt+1 + C + QF (  y) − E
 
  Y
   
(56)
Is Lmax still an optimal choice in the face of information asymmetry? In
answering this question we start analysing the right-hand side of (56). Again




assumes a zero value in this case. Hence like





Turning to the left-hand side of (56), note that the certainty equivalent for
Lt = Lmax is still equal to the non-seizable level of income C. For Lmax to
be an optimum we must then have
















where due to   y|Lmax = y, expected and realized contol costs coincide. Hence











Substituting (58) into 52) yields as an optimal loan volume
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Compared to symmetric information, the non-seizable rate of income can
now even be lower in order for Lt = Lmax. On the other hand, however,
the optimal loan size will be lower, too, and it is by no means certain that
the household borrows more than in the no-default case. Indeed this would





were higher than discounted control cost
Q
Rt+1
Finally note that in spite of control costs, household behaviour remains
unpredictable in situations in which a household without default option
would neither save nor borrow though the incentive to borrow in this case
will be lower due to control costs.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
The availability of a default option endows a household with limited liabil-
ity. Hence given that the riskless interest rate and the interest rate on loans
coincide, a risk-neutral household will always have an incentive to borrow
more than in the no-default-case. Knowing this, a bank which wants to
earn the riskless rate at least on average, will charge a suﬃciently higher
interest rate on loans thus preventing a risk-neutral household from bor-
rowing more than in the absence of a default option. We have shown that
this is no longer the case if households maximize a concave utility function
and hence dislike ﬂuctuations of consumption around its long-run average.
Whereas in the absence of default, these ﬂuctuations are exclusively de-
termined by the volatility and thus variance of household labour income,
under a default option, the variance of debt repayments and the covariance
of income and debt repayments play a role, too. Were it only for the vari-
ance, this would lower a household’s appetite for credit compared to the
no-default-case. Integrating the covariance of income and debt repayment
into the analysis, however, changes the argument signiﬁcantly. Since income
enhances consumption, whereas loan repayments do the opposite, undesired
income ﬂuctuations can be partly or - depending on the loan size - even be
fully oﬀset by ﬂuctuations in debt repayments. This indeed may explain
why households with a default option might be willing to borrow more than
without such a possibility. We have also shown that due to this particu-
lar relationship between income and debt repayment volatility, a household
may be inclined to choose the maximum debt level which implies that this
household will choose default. However, in order to be an optimal choice,
the non-seizable income has to be suﬃciently high because in maximizing
expected utility the household does not only want to minimize risk but also
to maximize consumption. In particular we have found that lower income
groups will be more prone to choosing default than higher income groups,
and generally, any household will be more inclined to defaulting in reces-
sions than in boom situations. Finally we have shown that in a situation
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where a household without default option may neither be willing to save
nor to borrow, the behaviour of a household with default option becomes
unpredictable in the sense that no borrowings as well as positive - even max-
imum - borrowings are compatible with an optimum. We also analysed bank
and household behaviour under ex post information asymmetry and found
that if the bank burdens the borrower with control costs, a household which
chooses its maximum loan volume will borrow less than in the symmetric
income case and moreover it is not certain that this same household will
borrow more than in the no-default-case.
Any appreciation of our results should take into account, however, that
in our model a loan contract is one-shot. Hence the household under con-
sideration has no concern about the availability of future loans and thus
about its reputation as a borrower. What role relationship banking plays
for the behaviour of lenders and borrowers has extensively been investigated
in terms of ﬁrms. How such a relation impacts household behaviour in
the face of a default option thus appears to be a valuable and interesting
extension.
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Calculation of the variance under information asymmetry and Dt =
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Calculation of the covariance under information asymmetry and
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